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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on May 1, 2008. No petition for rehearing 
was filed. Petitioner received an extension of time to file her Petition on June 2, 2008, 
extending the due date to July 2, 2008. Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 
July 2,2008. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on September 17, 2008. Jurisdiction in 
the Supreme Court is appropriate under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Jarmaccc sufficiently and timely 
presented its statute of limitations defenses. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the decision 
of the Court of Appeals, not the decision of the district court. Longley v. Leucadia Fin. 
Corp., 200 UT 69, ^ f 13, 9 P.3d 762. "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 11, 
48 P.3d 968. "This is the same standard of review we apply when we review a lower court's 
decision regarding the application of a statute of limitations, which is a question of law." In 
re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, ^ f 19, 144 P.3d 1129 (citing Russell PackardDev., Inc. v. 
Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^  18, 108 P.3d 741). To the extent that the court of appeals reviewed 
whether the trial court ruled on Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer, the 
Court of Appeals review of the trial court is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 
Pett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2, fflf 4,6. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The official report of the Court of Appeals decision is Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT 
App. 153. The Court of Appeals based its ruling exclusively on the applicability of the 
statute of limitations to bar Plaintiffs claim. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c), 9(h), 12(h), and 15(a), are of central importance 
to this appeal. The texts of these Rules are attached in the appendix of this brief. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (now § 78B-2-307(3)) is the four year statute of limitations that bars 
Plaintiffs action against Jarmaccc which was brought more than six years after Jarmaccc 
acquired the property. The text of this statute is attached in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
A judgment was entered in favor of North American Recovery Service ("NAR") 
against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs real property was attached and sold in satisfaction of the 
judgment. After the expiration of Plaintiff s right of redemption, the Sheriff issued a deed 
to NAR. Defendant Jarmaccc ("Jarmaccc") bought the property and received a deed from 
NAR on January 20, 1998. Plaintiff filed this quiet title action as a collateral attack on 
Defendants' ownership and sought to reacquire the property.1 
lThe trial court ruled that Jarmaccc Properties, LLC ("Jarmaccc") is the real party in 
interest. R.49l,1[6. 
2 
B. The Course of the Proceedings 
In the trial court, both Plaintiff and Jarmaccc filed motions for summary judgment. 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on May 4,2006. Jarmaccc appealed the 
trial court decision and the case was heard by the Utah Court of Appeals on March 24,2008. 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on May 1, 2008. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on September 17, 2008. 
C. Disposition of the Lower Court 
The Honorable Judge Mark S. Kouris entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, 
ruling that the sheriffs deed was void, that Jarmaccc was equitably estopped from asserting 
ownership of the Property, and denied Jarmaccc's statute of limitations defense. Jarmaccc 
appealed the trial court ruling to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals panel, Judges 
Billings, Orme, and Greenwood, unanimously reversed the trial court ruling and found that 
the statute of limitations defense had been properly raised and decided in the trial court and 
that the statute of limitations barred the Plaintiffs claim against Jarmaccc. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
This case concerns the ownership of real property sold at a sheriffs sale on March 8, 
1996. R. 490-491. NAR received the sheriff s deed to the property. Jarmaccc received a 
deed to the property from NAR on January 20,1998. R. 70. The Plaintiffbrought this action 
to quiet title in her favor against Jarmaccc on January 5, 2004. R. 1-4. In Jarmaccc's 
Answer, the statute of limitations affirmative defense was generally pled, R. 11-14, and on 
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November 23,2004, Jarmaccc filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Answer Under Rule 15(a) 
or Amend Answer to Conform to the Evidence Under Rule 15(b) to specifically identify Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) as the applicable statute of limitations. R. 321-322. This Motion 
for Leave to Amend was accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Leave to Amend, R. 331-334, and Jarmaccc's proposed Amended 
Answer. R. 335-338. On December 2, 2004, Plaintiff filed her Opposition to Jarmaccc's 
Motion for Leave to Amend. R. 339-343. On December 3, 2004, Jarmaccc filed its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer. R. 350-353. Also on 
December 3,2004, Jarmaccc filed a Notice to Submit for Decision regarding the Motion for 
Leave to Amend Answer. R. 358-359. 
On March 25, 2004, the parties entered into an Attorney Planning Meeting Report 
scheduling the dates and deadlines under which the case would be managed. R. 25-29. The 
deadline established for the amendment of pleadings was December 10, 2004. R. 28. 
Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer was filed on November 23,2004, before 
the amendment deadline. R. 321-22. 
Jarmaccc filed a Rule 56(f) Motion for Order of Continuance to Conduct Discovery 
on June 15, 2004. R. 118-119. In the Memorandum in Support of the Rule 56(f) Motion for 
Order of Continuance to Conduct Discovery, filed to allow discovery prior to the court ruling 
on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Jarmaccc specifically asserted the statute of 
limitation defenses. R. 126-127. After the discovery was completed, Jarmaccc filed its 
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Motion for Summary Judgment on November 2, 2004, R. 246-247, again relying on the 
statute of limitations to bar Plaintiffs claims. R. 256-258. 
Oral arguments on the cross motions for summary judgment were heard on February 
14,2005. R. 363. The court entered its Order disposing of the case on May 4,2006, quieting 
title to the property in Plaintiff and rejecting Jarmaccc's statute of limitations defense. R. 
490-492. Jarmaccc filed a Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2006. R.494. The matter was 
argued before the Court of Appeals on March 24, 2008. A unanimous Court of Appeals 
panel reversed the trial court on May 1, 2008 based on the Plaintiffs failure to meet the 
statute of limitations time bar. Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App. 153. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on September 17, 2008. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff argues that defendants must assert the statute of limitations defense in their 
answer or in a motion to dismiss. If this is not done, the affirmative defense is waived. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that the answer could be amended, but that in order for the 
amendment to be effective and avoid the waiver of the statute of limitations, the amendment 
must be granted by uleave of court." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Plaintiff argues that since there 
was no "leave of court" granting Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer, there 
is no amendment. Therefore, the waiver has occurred and is final. 
Jarmaccc acknowledges that the applicability of the statute of limitations is primarily 
framed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff fails to recognize that the trial court 
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ruled on Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend when it denied that the statute of limitations 
defenses were applicable. In addition, Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer 
was granted by implication when the trial court denied the applicability of Jarmaccc's statute 
of limitation defenses. R. 491, f 7. The trial court addressed the statute of limitations issue 
and in the process ruled upon Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer and no 
waiver of the statute of limitations occurred. The Court of Appeals reasoned that with the 
statute of limitations properly before the trial court, Plaintiff s claim was barred by the statute 
of limitations and reversed the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
JARMACCC SUFFICIENTLY AND TIMELY PRESENTED ITS 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
A. Jarmaccc moved to amend its Answer to assert the statute of limitations defense. 
Plaintiff claims that Jarmaccc waived the statute of limitations affirmative defense 
when it generally raised the statute of limitations defense in its Answer, but failed to 
specifically identify the statute and subsection upon which Jarmaccc relied. Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(c) requires that affirmative defenses, including the statute of limitations, be affirmatively 
pled. Rule 9(h) requires the statute of limitations defense be pled, "referring to or describing 
such statute [of limitations] specifically and defining by section number, subsection 
designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to 
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identify it." Rule 12(h) defines the waiver of defenses, stating that "[a] party waives all 
defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply, " Emphasis 
added. Rule 15(a) allows ". . . a party [to] amend his pleadings only by leave of court... and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires" Emphasis added. 
Jarmaccc raised the statute of limitations defense in the trial court by generally 
pleading the statute of limitations in its Answer and, relying on Rules 12(h) and 15(a), "by 
motion," filing its Motion for Leave to Amend Answer (R. 321-322) and its proposed 
Amended Answer (R.335-338) on November 23, 2004. The Amended Answer specifically 
alleged the statute of limitations and complied with Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 9(h) in specifically 
identifying Utah Code Ann § 78-12-25(3)(an action must be brought within four years for 
relief not otherwise provided for by law). Plaintiffs Opposition to the Motion to Amend the 
Answer was filed on December 2, 2004. R. 339-43. Jarmaccc's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of the Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer, R. 350-53, an4 the Notice to Submit 
for Decision were filed with the trial court on December 3, 2004. R. 358-59. From that 
moment on, the issue of Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer was before the 
trial court and ready to be ruled upon. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a) allows pleadings to be "freely" amended. Amendments 
of the pleadings are designed to allow a party to present all of his case on the merits and to 
maximize judicial economy. Pett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2, f 6. Amendments to the 
pleadings are liberally granted when the parties receive notice of thejssues raised and have 
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an opportunity to meet them. Id. at f^ 7. In Pett, the Supreme Court answered whether the 
trial court exceeded its discretion by granting leave to amend the answer. The Pett court 
stated: 
TJ6 We turn then to the question which we will answer: whether the trial 
court exceeded its discretion when it granted Autoliv's motion to amend its 
answer. Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs that a party 
may amend a pleading only by leave of the court, "and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). We have consistently 
encouraged liberal treatment of motions to amend a pleading as long as justice 
is furthered, and not hindered, by the amendment, so as to "allow examination 
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy, [while] 
safeguarding] the rights of the other party to have a reasonable time to meet 
a new issue." Cheney v. Rucker. 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) (citing Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15(b)). By permitting Autoliv to amend its answer, the trial court 
exercised its discretion in a manner wholly compatible with the spirit and 
principles that inform rule 15. 
*fl In Cheney, we addressed the amendment of an answer to add an 
affirmative defense, taking into consideration rule 8(c), which requires parties 
to plead affirmative defenses. Id. (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c)). There, we 
stated that parties must be "afforded the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they are 
entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When 
this is accomplished, that is all that is required." Id. at 91. 
TJ8 Here, Autoliv's motion to amend its answer was filed long before 
trial began and while discovery was still ongoing, leaving Ms. Pett adequate 
opportunity to respond to the newly raised defense. The trial court did not 
exceed its discretion in determining that the interests of justice were furthered, 
rather than impaired, by the grant of Autoliv's motion. 
See also, Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981)("A prime consideration in 
determining whether an amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity 
for the opposing party to meet the newly raised matter."). 
Plaintiff had the opportunity to oppose the asserted statute of limitations. When 
Jarmaccc filed its Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer and its proposed Amended 
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Answer, Plaintiff objected to the motion and filed Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer. R. 339-343. Therefore, Plaintiff had notice of the 
statute of limitations defense and the opportunity to meet that defense. 
Plaintiff cites Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 
1983), as authority for her position that an affirmative defense may be waived if not asserted 
in a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. The Staker court stated: 
The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative 
defense in a responsive pleading, or it is waived, Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) and 
12(h), unless an amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed pursuant 
to the requirements of Rule 15(a). 
Id. at 1190 (emphasis added). The Staker decision is distinguishable from the case at bar 
because the defendant in Staker sought to amend its answer on the morning of trial to assert 
the statute of limitations for the first time. The parties in Staker undertook discovery over 
a two year period. As a result of the motion to amend the answer, the discovery would have 
been nullified. In the case at bar, the parties have undertaken virtually no discovery, no trial 
date had been set, and the motion to amend was filed within the time period established in 
the Attorney Planning Meeting Report. R. 25-29. Making a motion to amend an answer to 
assert the statute of limitations claim on the morning of trial after several years of expense 
and discovery is far different than moving to amend an answer after virtually no discovery 
and prior to any trial setting. 
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Public policies underlying the liberal amendment policy of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure are satisfied and furthered by Jarmaccc's amendment to its answer. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held: 
A prime consideration in determining whether an amendment should be 
permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for the opposing party to meet the 
newly raised matter. In Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc., this court stated the matter as follows: 
Some tempest has been raised about the court allowing 
the plaintiff to make tardy amendments to the pleadings. In 
doing so, he (the trial judge) wisely and properly stated: "The 
pleadings are never more important than the cause that is before 
the court . . . . There can be no prejudice in this case because 
we'll give ample time for any answer .. .." This is in harmony 
with what we regard as the correct policy: of recognizing the 
desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely framed 
issues, but also of permitting amendment where the interest of 
justice so requires, and the adverse party is given a fair 
opportunity to meet it. (Citations omitted.) 
In the instant case, plaintiff has had and will have an adequate 
opportunity to meet the additional issue raised. He has not been placed in a 
position of distinct disadvantage or prejudice. On the contrary, neither party 
is placed in a position of any greater advantage or disadvantage by virtue of the 
amendment to the pleadings. Also, the amendment having been made long 
before trial, it was not incumbent upon [defendant] to demonstrate "manifest 
injustice" in order for the trial court to appropriately exercise its discretion in 
authorizing the pleadings to be amended. On the other hand, no "manifest 
injustice" is evident as against plaintiff by reason of the amendment. 
Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94,98 (Utah 1981). The policy of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
that developed issues be presented to the court, including amendments to the pleadings, is 
fulfilled by the liberal allowance of amendments. 
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Courts liberally grant motions to amend pleadings when parties seek to correct errors 
in their pleadings or to amplify defenses that have already been stated in the answer. 
. . . [Pjlaintiff typically will not be precluded from amending a defective 
complaint in order to state a claim on which relief can be granted or from 
adding a claim to an otherwise proper complaint simply because that 
amendment may increase defendant's potential liability. Similarly, plaintiff 
will not be sufficiently prejudiced to justify a denial of an application under 
Rule 15(a) if defendant is allowed to cure an insufficient defense or to amplify 
a defense that already has been stated in the answer. 
Wright and Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1487. Jarmaccc pled the statute of limitations in its 
original Answer and sought to specifically designate the statute of limitations defense in its 
Amended Answer. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), Jarmaccc filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the 
Answer to specifically identify the statute of limitations. 
The parties anticipated the need for amendments to the pleadings in the Attorney's 
Planning Meeting Report, R. 25-29, and together agreed that these amendments should occur 
before December 10, 2004. The purpose of the deadline was to give the parties sufficient 
time to prepare their cases for trial without the risk of changes being made in the pleadings. 
Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer was filed on November 23,2004, before 
the amendment deadline. R. 321-22. 
The Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff and the trial court clearly had written notice 
of the statute of limitations defense from the filed documents, including the proposed 
Amended Answer. Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App. 153, \ 18. With the Motion for Leave 
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to Amend the Answer pending before the trial court, the court had an obligation to rule on 
the pending motion. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had made such a ruling. 
B. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court ruled on Jarmaccc's 
statute of limitations defense. 
On February 14, 2005, more than two months after the Notice to Submit was filed, 
placing Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer at issue, the trial court held a 
hearing to decide the issues of this case. In his ruling, Judge Kouris sought to address all of 
the outstanding issues of the case. He ruled on Jarmaccc's Motion to Dismiss, R. 18-19, 
which Motion had been filed simultaneously with the Answer and had been pending before 
the trial court for over a year. Likewise, Judge Kouris also ruled upon Jarmaccc's Motion 
for Leave to Amend the Answer and denied Jarmaccc's statute of limitations defense. R. 
491, [^ 7 ("The defendants' arguments concerning the statute of limitations and whether the 
plaintiff was required to bring her defective deed action against the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County are denied."). In denying Jarmaccc's statute of limitations defense, the trial court 
acknowledged that the Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer was pending before the trial 
court. In addition, the Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer was ruled upon when the trial 
court ruled that Jarmaccc's statute of limitations defense was denied. The Motion for Leave 
to Amend the Answer was necessarily ruled upon before the trial court could address the 
statute of limitations issue. The trial court then denied the applicability of the statute of 
limitations defense. Thus, the trial court ruled upon the Motion for Leave to Amend the 
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Answer. The statute of limitations was before the trial court and ruled upon. The Court of 
Appeals recognized the trial court's determination of the Motion for Leave to Amend the 
Answer and based its ruling upon it. 
If this Court finds that the trial court did not rule upon Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave 
to Amend the Answer, the Motion was nevertheless ruled upon by implication. "When a 
final disposition of a case is entered by a district court, any unresolved motions . . . are 
deemed resolved by implication." State v. Mullens, 2005 UT 43, f 8,116 P.3d 374. See also, 
Utah Farm Production Credit Assn. v. Watts, 111 P.2d 154,157 (Utah 1987) (holding that 
a motion to strike was granted by implication due to a subsequent grant of summary 
judgment). By implication, the trial court ruled upon Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend 
the Answer when it specifically addressed the statute of limitations issue and denied 
Jarmaccc's statute of limitations defense. Had the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer not 
been ruled upon, there would have been an unresolved issue pending and the summary 
judgment would not have been a final order. 
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had addressed the statute of limitations 
issue in its ruling and thereby ruled on Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer. 
Because of the Court of Appeals' finding that the statute of limitations was properly before 
the trial court and available for determination on appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the 
statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs claim and reversed the trial court. 
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C. The Court of Appeals correctly found that Jarmaccc's statute of limitations 
defenses were clearly raised. 
Plaintiff also attacks the Court of Appeals decision for referring to the occasions when 
Jarmaccc raised the statute of limitations defense. In determining whether Plaintiff had 
adequate notice of Jarmaccc's statute of limitation defenses, the Court of Appeals referred 
to the number of times the statute of limitation defenses had been raised by Jarmaccc. 
Jarmaccc raise the statute of limitation defenses consistently throughout the proceeding. The 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that Plaintiff had sufficient notice that Jarmaccc was 
asserting the statute of limitations and acknowledged that Plaintiff had the opportunity to 
respond to the statute of limitation defenses. Contrary to Plaintiffs argument that these 
notices were errant pleadings, Plaintiffs repeated responses to Jarmaccc's assertions of the 
statute of limitations was proof that Plaintiff was notified concerning the statute of limitation 
defenses and had ample opportunity to respond to the statute of limitations issue. "'When 
[notice and an opportunity to respond are] accomplished, that is all that is required." Pett v 
Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2, \ 7. 
In the trial court, Plaintiffs primary position was that no statute of limitations was 
applicable in a quiet title action. Plaintiff relied on Condor v. Hunt, 2000 UT App. 105, 1 
P.3d 558, 564, as justification for this position. The issue of the applicability of the statute 
of limitations was pending before the trial court prior to the Court's ruling in In re Hoopiiaina 
Trust, 2006 UT 53, J^ 27 (". . . [I]f it is [] necessary that the court grant other relief in favor 
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of the party, such as cancelling a deed . . . in order to rule on the quiet title claim,. .." then 
the statute of limitations is applicable). Plaintiff asserted that no statute of limitations was 
applicable to bar Plaintiffs claim. This position was the basis for Plaintiffs position that 
allowing Jarmaccc to amend its Answer was futile. The parties sought a decision from the 
trial court on the applicability of the statute of limitations to quiet title actions. The trial 
court's ruling on the summary judgment motions confirms that the trial court adopted 
Plaintiffs position and ruled that the statutes of limitation were not applicable to quiet title 
actions. Nevertheless, the trial court accepted the issue of the statute of limitations as 
pending before the court and ruled that although the statute of limitations issue was pending, 
no statute of limitations defense was applicable to bar Plaintiffs claims. 
Jarmaccc asserted the statute of limitation defenses in the following filings: 
1. Jarmaccc's Answer, 
In its initial Answer, Jarmaccc raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense, indicating that "Plaintiffs claim against Defendants is barred under the doctrine of 
statute of limitations." R. 13. 
2. Jarmaccc's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
Shortly after the filing of the Attorney's Planning Meeting Report, Plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 111-112. Because of the number of issues that were 
raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment and the fact that no discovery had been 
undertaken by Jarmaccc, Jarmaccc filed Defendants' Rule 56(f) Motion for Order of 
15 
Continuance to Conduct Discovery. R. 118-119. The Memorandum supporting Defendants' 
Rule 56(f) Motion raised two statute of limitation defenses which Jarmaccc believed barred 
the trial court from entering summary judgment against Jarmaccc. *R. 120-32. Jarmaccc 
asserted Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28 (two year statute for all claims against a sheriff acting 
in its official capacity) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (three year statute for mistake). R. 
127. The record does not reflect that Plaintiff responded to Jarmaccc's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
The trial court granted Jarmaccc's Rule 56(f) Motion in an Order dated July 28, 2004. R. 
156. 
3. Jarmaccc's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In Jarmaccc's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jarmaccc again asserted Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-26 and §78-12-28 as bars to Plaintiff s claim. R.248-306. Plaintiffresponded 
to Jarmaccc's statute of limitations claim in Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants' Opposition to 
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming 
that no statute of limitations applied when a party in actual possession of property was 
seeking to quiet their title and that the statute of limitations had not been properly pled. R. 
307-320. 
4. Jarmaccc's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Jarmaccc responded to Plaintiffs assertion that no statute of limitations applied 
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to quiet title actions and asserted that in addition to the previously cited statutes of 
limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) also barred Plaintiffs claims. R. 323-330. 
5. Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer and the proposed Amended 
Answer. 
Jarmaccc filed its Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer exclusively for the purpose 
of asserting Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3). R. 321-22. This was virtually the only change 
made to the Answer in its amended form. Jarmaccc filed a Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer which accentuated the statute of limitations being 
asserted in the proposed Amended Answer. R. 331-334. The proposed Amended Answer 
contains the specific Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) statute of limitations. R. 335-338. 
Plaintiff filed its Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer claiming 
that no statute of limitations applied in a quiet title action when the party possessed the 
property and that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) was inapplicable because it excluded real 
property. R. 339-343. 
The Court of Appeals recognized these assertions of the statute of limitations by 
Jarmaccc as notice of Jarmaccc's intent to rely on the statute of limitation defenses. Based 
on the Plaintiffs responses and the several month lapse of time between the assertion of the 
statute of limitation defenses and the ruling of the trial court, Plaintiff had both notice of 
Jarmaccc's claim that the statutes of limitation were applicable and the opportunity to 
respond and address Jarmaccc's assertions. 
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POINT II. 
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRANT JARMACCC'S MOTION TO 
AMEND THE COMPLAINT, IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
STATE THE REASONS FOR DENYING THE MOTION TO AMEND 
A. Failure to state the reasons for denying a motion to amend pleadings is an abuse 
of discretion. 
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had ruled on Jarmaccc's Motion for 
Leave to Amend the Complaint. Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App. 153,118. However, if 
this Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had ruled on 
Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer, this Court should remand the case back 
to the trial court for a determination of Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer. 
In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), the U.S. Supreme 
Court held: 
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend 'shall be freely given when 
justice so requires'; this mandate is to be heeded. See generally, 3 Moore, 
Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948), 15.08, 15.10. If the underlying facts or 
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject orrelief, he 
ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the 
absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith 
or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely 
given.' Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the 
discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without 
any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; 
it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the 
Federal Rules. 
See also, Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995)(because there was no justification 
given for denying the motion to amend,"... we vacate the district court's order denying the 
motion for leave to amend and remand to the district court for reconsideration of the 
motion."). 
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At a minimum, if the Supreme Court does not find that the trial court ruled on 
Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer, then the Court must believe that the 
Motion for Leave to Amend was denied as claimed by Plaintiff If this is the case, the trial 
court did not provide any justification for denying the Motion for Leave to Amend and has 
thereby abused its discretion in denying that motion. The issue should therefore be remanded 
to the trial court for the determination of the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer. 
POINT III 
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON JARMACCC'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE ANSWER, THE 
ORDER OF MAY 4, 2005 WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER. 
If this Court finds that the trial court did not rule on Jarmaccc's Motion for Leave to 
Amend the Answer, then this appeal must be remanded to the trial court because this Court 
and the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. In Cobon Energy v. 
AGTC, Inc., 2005 UT App. 29, the Court of Appeals ruled that since there was no signed 
summary judgment order, but only an unsigned minute entry, there was no final judgment 
and there was no jurisdiction for the appeal. "With no final order on summary judgment, the 
case remains pending and unripe for appeal. Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court 
lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal." Id. See, Bradbury'v. Valencia, 2000 UT 
50,H 8, 5 P.3d 649. 
In the case at bar, the appeal was taken because of the ruling of the trial court on May 
4, 2005. In that ruling, the trial court indicated that the statute of limitations was not 
applicable to the bar Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff alleges that there was not determination of 
the Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer and it is therefore not granted "by leave of 
court." Jarmaccc asserts that the Motion for Leave to Amend was ruled upon by the trial 
court and was before the Court of Appeals on review. If the Motion for Leave to Amend the 
Answer was not expressly ruled upon by the trial court or implicitly determined by the trial 
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court, this Court should remand the case back to the trial court for entry of the entry of the 
final Ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rules of Civil Procedure allow for pleadings to be amended. Jarmaccc filed a 
Motion to Amend the Answer. The Motion to Amend the Answer was fully briefed and 
submitted to the trial court for decision. The trial court ruled on the Motion to Amend 
Answer by addressing the statute of limitations in its ruling. In addition, Jarmaccc's Motion 
for Leave to Amend the Answer was ruled upon by implication when Jarmaccc's statute of 
limitation defenses were denied. Plaintiff had notice of the statute of limitation defenses and 
an opportunity to respond to that issue. Since the statute of limitations was ruled upon by the 
trial court, the statute of limitations issue was before the Court of Appeals and it 
appropriately ruled that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs claims. If the Supreme 
Court reverses the Court of Appeals decision, the amendment of the pleadings issue should 
be remanded to the trial court for determination. 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
|^l Defendants Ralph Petty, Jarmac 
Jarmaccc, Inc. (collectively Jarmac 
grant of summary judgment in favor 
Bangerter. Specifically, Jarmaccc 
erred in determining that a sheriff 
house (the Property) is void becaus 
an incorrect legal description or i 
of equitable estoppel. We reverse 
consistent with this opinion. 
cc Properties, LLC, and 
cc) appeal the trial court's 
of Plaintiff Sonya Capri 
argues that the trial court 
's sale of Ms. Bangerterfs 
e the sheriff's sale included 
s estopped under the doctrine 
and remand for proceedings 
BACKGROUND 
f2 Ms. Bangerter and her former husband Roger Scott Bangerter1 
purchased the Property in April 1994. Ms. Bangerter had an 
outstanding bill owed to her dentist, which was turned over to 
the North American Recovery Services collection agency (N.A.R.). 
On April 25, 1995, a judgment was entered against the Bangerters 
in the amount of $3 07.46. On August 14, 1995, a trial judge 
signed a writ of execution commanding the sheriff "to collect the 
judgment, with costs, interest, and fees, and to sell enough of 
defendant's non-exempt real property to satisfy the same." 
i[3 On December 21, 1995, a deputy sheriff filed a notice of 
real estate levy against the Property. The notice stated: 
Notice is hereby given, that under and by 
virtue of a Writ of Execution, issued out of 
the Circuit Court of the State of Utah, of 
which the annexed is a true copy, I have this 
day attached and levied upon all right, 
title, claim and interest of defendant(s), 
of, in and to the following described Real 
Estate, standing on the records of Salt Lake 
County, in the name of defendant, [] 
Bangerter, and particularly described as 
follows: BEG 67 FT E & 69 FT N OF SW COR LOT 
68, GLENDALE PARK SUB, PLAT A; N 60 FT; E 12 0 
FT TO BEG. 0.19 AC. 
1(4 On March 8, 1996, the deputy sheriff signed a real estate 
certificate of sale execution against the Property, which was 
filed for record with the county recorder's office on March 28, 
1996. The real estate certificate of sale identified the 
parties, case number, and the dates of the judgment rendered, 
execution issued, and sale of the Property. It also stated, in 
relevant part: 
I hereby certify that under an Execution 
issued out of the Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, in an action pending 
in said Court in the above named suit, I was 
commanded to take the sum of $263.56, with 
interest, costs and Sheriff's fees, amounting 
1. The Bangerters divorced in April 2000. Sonya Bangerter was 
awarded the Property as part of the divorce settlement. Although 
her husband's name appears on the writ of execution, no party has 
mentioned him as part of this lawsuit. 
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in all to the sum of $958.02, to satisfy the 
judgment in said action by selling the 
unexempted real property of the said 
defendant. I have levied upon, and . . . 
after due and legal notice I sold at public 
auction, according to law, the real property 
to Jarmac[cc] L.L.C., for the sum of 
$1,550.00, which was the highest bid made for 
all the right, title, claim and interest of 
said defendants. . . . I further certify 
that said property is subject to redemption 
in lawful money of the United States of 
America, pursuant to the statute in such 
cases made and provided. 
This document also included the same property description listed 
in the notice of levy. 
i|5 The rules of civil procedure that were in effect at the time 
required the sheriff to 
serve upon the judgment debtor, in the same 
manner as service of a summons in a civil 
action, or cause to be transmitted by both 
regular and certified mail, returned receipt 
requested, to the judgment debtor's last 
known address as provided by the judgment 
creditor, (i) the notice of execution and 
exemptions and right to a hearing, and (ii) 
the application by which the judgment debtor 
may request a hearing. Upon service of the 
writ, the sheriff or constable may also set 
the date of sale or delivery and serve upon 
the judgment debtor notice of the date ahd 
time of sale or delivery in the same manner 
as service of the notice of execution and 
exemptions and right to a hearing. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(g) (2004). 
f6 On September 16, 1996, a sheriff's deed was signed by the 
sheriff and N.A.R., explaining that the sheriff had sold the 
Property according to law to N.A.R. for $1550 and that no 
redemption had been made. On November 12, 1996, Petty filed a 
request for notice concerning the Property, requesting notices of 
default or sale. On November 16, 1996, the sheriff's deed was 
recorded, noting (1) certain legal property was sold at a 
sheriff's sale on March 5, 1996, to N.A.R. for $1550, (2) more 
than six months had elapsed without any redemption of the 
property, and (3) the property was sold. The sheriff's deed 
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conveyed the property to N.A.R. It also included the same 
property description as mentioned above. 
H7 On January 5, 1998, the sheriff filed an amended real estate 
certificate of sale execution. The amended certificate of sale 
execution identified the property as: 
Beginning at a point 670 feet East and 69 
feet North of the Southwest corner of Lot 68, 
GLENDALE PARK SUBDIVISION, PLAT "A", Salt 
Lake City, Utah, being in the Southwest 
quarter of Section 11, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence North 69 feet; thence East 
12 0 feet; thence South 69 feet; thence West 
120 feet to the point of beginning. SIDWELL 
# 15-11-331-010. 
%S On January 20, 1998, N.A.R. filed a quitclaim deed in favor 
of Jarmaccc Properties, LLC, regarding the Property. On March 
10, 1998, Bangerter filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. On 
May 14, 1998, Jarmaccc served Bangerter with a notice to quit, 
instructing her to vacate the Property, but this could not be 
pursued because of her pending bankruptcy action. 
1(9 On April 23, 1999, Bangerter filed a second petition in 
bankruptcy. As part of her Chapter 13 plan, Bangerter listed 
Jarmaccc as a secured creditor and scheduled $1200 to be paid to 
Jarmaccc. Jarmaccc received a copy of Bangerter's bankruptcy 
plan but did not object. Bangerter paid Jarmaccc the full amount 
set out by the bankruptcy plan. The bankruptcy was dismissed on 
August 26, 2003 because of Bangerter's failure to make payments, 
and no discharge was granted. 
if 10 On January 6, 2004, Bangerter filed this action against 
Jarmaccc, seeking quiet title to the Property. On July 2, 2004, 
Bangerter filed a third Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. During 
the pendency of the bankruptcy action, both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment to resolve the case. The court ruled in 
Bangerter's favor on May 4, 2006. 
i|ll The trial court found: 
1. The original sale of [Bangerter's] 
property contained an incorrect legal 
description and thus created a defective 
title which failed to convey any title to 
[Jarmaccc] or any other person or entity; 
2. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., was on 
notice of [Bangerter's] bankruptcy filing; 
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3. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., received a 
copy of and failed to object to [Bangerter's] 
proposed Chapter 13 plan; 
4. [Bangerter] paid [Jarmaccc] the full 
amount set out by the bankruptcy plan; 
5. [Bangerter] will be injured if [Jarmaccc] 
is allowed to contradict its actions in 
accepting the payments made pursuant to the 
Chapter 13 plan; 
7. [Jarmaccc's] arguments concerning the 
statute of limitations and whether 
[Bangerter] was required to bring her 
defective deed action against the Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County are denied. 
The trial court then quieted title in Bangerter and extinguished 
any claim by Jarmaccc to the Property. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
fl2 Jarmaccc argues that the trial court erred in concluding no 
statute of limitations barred Bangerter's action and granting 
summary judgment in favor of Bangerter. "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Because summary judgment presents only questions of law, we 
give no deference to the district court's legal decisions and 
review them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 
2004 UT 85, 1 10, 100 P.3d 1200 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).2 
ANALYSIS 
fl3 Jarmaccc argues that Bangerter's suit is barred by the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. Jarmaccc asserts that 
the tolling date for the statute of limitations is January 20, 
1998, the day N.A.R. conveyed the Property to Jarmaccc, or at the 
very latest, March 10, 1998, when Bangerter filed her first 
petition for bankruptcy. Jarmaccc contends that Bangerter "knew 
of" Jarmaccc before that date. Bangerter did nothing to attack 
either the sheriff's sale or Jarmaccc's ownership of the Property 
2. Jarmaccc raises additional issues on appeal. However, 
because we conclude that the trial court did not err in 
concluding no statute of limitations barred Bangerter's action, 
we do not address the other issues raised on appeal. 
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until she filed this action on January 6, 2004, almost six years 
later.3 
i[l4 On appeal, Jarmaccc offers three possible statutes of 
limitations which might bar Bangerter's action: Utah Code 
section 78-12-28(1), see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(1) (2002) 
(,f[a]n action may be brought within two years against a . . . 
sheriff . . . for liability incurred by the doing of an act in 
his official capacity"), Utah Code section 78-12-26(3), see id. 
§ 78-12-26(3) (2002) ("[a]n action may be brought within three 
years . . . for relief on the ground of . . . mistake"), or the 
general statute of limitations, Utah Code section 78-12-25(3), 
see id. § 78-12-25(3) (2002) ("[a]n action may be brought within 
four years . . . for relief not otherwise provided for by law."). 
We need not analyze which of the three statutes of limitations is 
relevant as all of them expired before Bangerter brought her 
suit. 
I. Was the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations 
Properly Pleaded? 
i[l5 Bangerter argues that the statute of limitations cannot bar 
her lawsuit because it was not specifically pleaded and proved at 
trial. Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates: 
In pleading the statute of limitations it is 
not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense but it may be alleged generally that 
the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing such statute 
specifically and definitely by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or 
otherwise designating the provision relied 
upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If 
such allegation is controverted, the party 
3. In a signed affidavit dated June 1, 2004, Bangerter states "I 
never received any notice from any person that my home would be 
sold to any party as the result of the debt for dental services." 
This statement is in conflict with the sheriff's sworn statements 
in the certificate of sale that he complied with the notice 
requirements. However, this factual question is ultimately 
immaterial because we conclude all the potentially applicable 
statutes of limitations expired before she brought her actions to 
void the title received pursuant to the sheriff's sale. Further, 
she does not deny receiving the May 14, 1998 Notice to Vacate 
Property and, in fact, in 1999 listed Jarmaccc as a secured 
creditor in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. 
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pleading the statute must establish, on the 
trial, the facts showing that the cause of 
action is so barred. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(h) (emphasis added). 
Hl6 In its first answer, Jarmaccc raised the statute of 
limitations by stating simply that "Plaintiff's claim against 
Defendants is barred under the doctrine of statute of 
limitations." However, our review of the record shows that in 
Jarmaccc's Rule 56(f) Motion for Order of Continuance to Conduct 
Discovery, dated June 15, 2004, and the accompanying memorandum 
in support, Jarmaccc quite clearly laid out its arguments 
concerning the various statutes of limitations. It offered both 
Utah Code section 78-12-26 and Utah Code section 78-12-28 as 
possible statutes of limitations that would bar Bangerter's 
claim. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-26, -28. Jarmaccc again 
explained its argument in its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated November 23, 2 004, 
and filed an amended answer which included Utah Code section 78-
12-25(3), the general statute of limitations. Furthermore, the 
trial court considered and ruled upon these arguments. 
i|l7 Bangerter argues that Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, 1 
P.3d 558, prevents Jarmaccc from relying on its statute of 
limitations argument. In Conder, the defendants specifically 
pleaded two statutes of limitation, one for written contracts, 
and one for fraud. See id. % 13. However, in their motions for 
summary judgment, the defendants argued only the statute 
applicable to fraud actions. See id. This court rejected the 
defendants1 argument on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not 
actually alleged fraud in their complaint, but rather styled 
their complaint as one to quiet title. See id. H 14. We 
concluded that because the defendants had not shown that their 
chosen statute of limitations applied, we would not consider 
other statutes of limitation that might have applied. See id. 
%*h 14, 17. We find this case distinguishable from the one before 
us. 
i|l8 Bangerter and the trial court clearly had written notice of 
the three statutes of limitations at issue from documents filed 
with the court, including an amended answer. In fact, the trial 
court ruled on the issue. Moreover, which statute of limitations 
is applicable is irrelevant because all of the statutes Jarmaccc 
pleaded had passed before Bangerter brought her lawsuit. 
II. Quiet Title Action--No Statute of Limitations 
i|l9 The trial court may have determined that the statute of 
limitations arguments were without merit because, in Utah, no 
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statute of limitations applies to a nsuit[] brought to quiet the 
title to real property." See In Re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 
1 26, 144 P.3d 1129. 
[^2 0 In In re Hoopiiaina Trust, id. , the Utah Supreme Court 
clarified the rule on statutes of limitations concerning actions 
to quiet title. We quote liberally: 
[I]t is clear that all actions, whether legal 
or equitable, are subject to a statute of 
limitations in Utah. However, suits brought 
to quiet the title to real property have 
always been an exception to this rule. A 
true quiet title action is a suit brought "to 
quiet an existing title against an adverse or 
hostile claim of another," and "the effect of 
a decree quieting title is not to vest title 
but rather is to perfect an existing title as 
against other claimants." Thus, the question 
becomes whether a claim is a true quiet title 
action or whether the claimant really seeks 
other relief; if the claim is a true quiet 
title action, it is not subject to a statute 
of limitations. Courts must proceed 
cautiously when applying this rule, however, 
for parties should not be able to avoid the 
statute of limitations on other claims by 
simply disguising them as claims for quiet 
title relief. 
. . . [A] court must examine the relief 
sought in order to determine whether the 
statute of limitations applies. When a party 
asserts a quiet title claim in which that 
party merely requests that the court 
adjudicate the validity of an opponent's 
adverse or hostile claim to property to which 
the party already holds title, no statute of 
limitations applies. In other words, if it 
is not necessary that the court grant other 
relief in favor of the party, such as 
cancelling a deed on the basis of fraud,.in 
order to rule on the quiet title claim, then 
the statute of limitations cannot operate as 
a bar to the party's quiet title claim. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the 
statute of limitations applies to a quiet 
title claim, the court must assess on what 
basis the party would be entitled to have 
title quieted. If the party is entitled to 
have title quieted only if the court first 
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finds in his or her favor on another legal 
issue, then the same statute of limitations 
that applies to that legal issue will also 
apply to the quiet title claim. Similarly, a 
party may seek to quiet title to real 
property in addition to requesting other 
relief in the same action. Despite the fact 
that no statute of limitations applies to a 
true quiet title claim, the respective 
statutes of limitation applicable to the 
party's other claims for relief may operate 
to bar those claims. If the party's claim 
for quiet title relief can be granted only if 
the party succeeds on another claim, then the 
statute of limitations applicable to the 
other claim will also apply to the quiet 
title claim. 
Id. mi 26-27 (last three emphases added) (citations omitted). 
[^21 We must evaluate, then, whether Bangerter's action is a 
"true" quiet title claim. We conclude that it is not. 
Bangerter's suit against Jarmaccc is necessarily predicated on a 
challenge to the validity of the sheriff's sale and the title 
deed which was a result of that sale. Without that underlying 
challenge, she has no claim against Jarmaccc, who rightfully 
received the Property from N.A.R., who fairly purchased it at a 
sheriff's sale. In fact, without first challenging the sheriff's 
sale, Bangerter does not have title to the Property and cannot 
quiet it. Thus, Bangerter can only succeed on an action to quiet 
her title to the Property if the court first invalidates the 
sheriff's sale. Bangerter's action here is thus not a "true" 
action to quiet title, and, under Hoopiiaina, some statute of 
limitations applies. See id. As previously noted, it is 
irrelevant which statute of limitations applies, because they all 
passed prior to Bangerter's initiation of this lawsuit. 
1(22 Bangerter attempts to distinguish Hoopiiaina from this case. 
She argues that Hoopiiaina did not deal with a situation where 
someone was in "actual and continuous possession of the 
property." She relies on Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, 1 P.3d 
558, which was decided before Hoopiiaina and in dicta 
"recognize[d] the general rule . . . that those in actual 
possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of 
limitation from seeking to quiet their title." Id. K 17. In 
Conder, we noted that "[w]hile no Utah case cited by the parties 
specifically adopts this rule, a number of cases seem to assume 
that Utah adheres to it." Id. We specifically stated that "a 
definitive ruling on the question must await a case in which it 
is more squarely in issue." Id. 
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i|23 We conclude Conder and Hoopiiaina are consistent. A person 
in possession who seeks to quiet their own title is not barred by 
any statute of limitations. In this case, Bangerter no longer 
had the title to the Property. Thus, Bangerter is not pursuing a 
"true" quiet title action because she did not have the title to 
the Property at the time she was in possession of the Property 
and brought her lawsuit. She therefore is not free from the 
constraints of a statute of limitations. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the statute of limitations bars her suit. 
i|24 We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
Bangerter's favor, and direct the trial court to grant summary 
judgment in Jarmaccc's favor because Bangerter's lawsuit is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
12 5 I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
1(2 9 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT. COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL? DISTRICT 
I N J^JJ F0R S A L T L A K E CouNTY, STATE OP ' 1JT fi H 
SONIA CAPRI BANGERTER, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO 040.900081 
vs . : 
RA LPH PE IT* • '.., : Judge Mark S, Kouris 
Defendants. : 
Before this Court is the defendants' Objection to the proposed Order 
granting the plaintiff's Motion for Summary J\ ldgmenf 1 \\f t Inf f-ndnnf r:i' 
Motion for Restitution, and other miscellaneous matters. This Court 
heard the Motion for Summary Judgment on February 14, 2005, with Thomas 
N. Thompson of Haskins & Associates, L.I J.C , representing the plaintiff, 
and" Ralph Petty, of counsel with Berrett & Assoc., I
 (.C,, representing the 
d e f e nda n t. s . ' i an t: e d t: 1 I e p 3 a i n t :i f £ ' s 1^  1 o t: i oi \ 1. (; r Summary 
Judgment. The defendant then filed an Objection to the proposed Order 
and a Motion for Restitution . The Coi o :t coi idi icted i second hearing on 
April 18., 2 0 05. Both attorneys were present The Court finds the 
following: 
•1. The original sale of the plaintiff's property contained an 
incorrect legal description and thus created a defective title 
BANGERTER V PETTY PAGE 2 ORDER 
which failed to convey any title to the defendant or any other 
person or entity; 
2. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., was on notice of the plaintiff's 
bankruptcy fi1ing; 
3. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., received a copy of and failed to 
object to the plaintiff's proposed Chapter 13 plan; 
4. The plaintiff paid the defendant the full amount set out by 
the bankruptcy plan; 
5. The plaintiff will be injured if the defendant is allowed to 
contradict its actions in accepting the payments made pursuant 
to the Chapter 13 plan; 
-6 Jar-maGG~£nG—and-Mr— -Ralph-Refc-ty -have— d-i-SG-laimed-an-y—interest 
in any property in this action, and the Court therefore finds 
that they have no claim or interest in the plaintiff's 
property; 
1, The defendants' arguments concerning the statute of 
limitations and whether the plaintiff was required to bring 
her defective deed action against the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County are denied. 
This Court then hereby orders that the title to the real property 
BANGER!ER V PI 1 I 1 /n J i ORDER 
in J j MI» in tin. <do( > nt IMI u 1J 1J JOULII 1 1 00 We^t City of Salt Lake 
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and more particulaily described 
Beginning at a point 670 feet East and 6 9 feet North oi the 
Southwest corner of Lot 68, GLENDALE PARK SUBDIVISION, PLAT 
"A", Salt Lake City, Utah, being m the Southwest quarter of 
Section li lownship 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 69 feet, thence East J 20 
feet; thence South 69 feet, thence West 1 o 1 eel t o t he point 
of beginning SIDWELL #15-11-1331-010. 
j heiehy juiPted in the plaintiff and any claim in and to the leal 
propeity by the delendants herein, oi any of them, is hereby disallowed 
I I J f 1 1 | I X L 1 1 I 
It i s fu r the r o rde red tha t the d e f e n d a n t s ' Motion f o r R e s t i t u t i o n 
BANGERTER V PETTY PAGE 4 ORDE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of th< 
foregoing Order, to the following, this^f__day of May, 2006 
James C Haskms 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ralph C Petty 
Attorney for Defendant 
50 S Main Street, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
)M 
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new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc-
tion, court could restore jury findings under 
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
within ten days. National Farmers' Union 
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
Orders. 
—Correction. 
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
flected judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
court, judge could correct order on his own 
motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 
196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956). 
—Necessity. 
Unless the court explicitly directs that no 
order needs to be submitted, no finality will be 
ascribed to a memorandum decision or minute 
entry for purposes of triggering the running of 
the time for appeal Code v Utah Dep't of 
Health, 2007 UT 43, 162 P.3d 1097. 
—Submission to court. 
If the prevailing party fails to submit an 
order within the 15-day period required by this 
rule, any party interested in finality, including 
the non-prevailing party, may submit an order. 
Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162 
P.3d 1097. 
Reply memorandum. 
District court had the discretion to consider 
points raised in a reply memorandum submit-
ted in support of summary judgment although 
the original motion addressed only one cause of 
action, but other causes of action were ad-
dressed in the reply. No supplemental briefing 
was filed after the moving party stated it was 
seeking summary judgment on all of the claims, 
despite a request for leave to supplement an 
opposition document. Dimick v. OHC Liquida-
tion Trust, 2007 UT App 73, 572 Utah Adv. Rep. 
21, 157 P.3d 347. 
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. Heirs 
of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956); 
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 
895; Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2006 UT App 
113, 133 P.3d 438; Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 
578 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 164 P.3d 366, Tuttle v. 
Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 
155 P.3d 893; Heideman v Washington City, 
2007 UT App 11, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5,155 P.3d 
900. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Ju r 2d Motions, 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d 
Pleading §§ 31 et seq., 665 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1 et 
seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et 
seq., 211 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as 
affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R 3d 1113. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or 
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good 
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make 
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he 
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert 
all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set 
forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 28 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat 
the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading 
to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(e)(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(e)(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative 
and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not 
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he 
has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set 
forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 8, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, U.R.C.R 15. 
Arbitration, § 78-31a-101 et seq. 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.R 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§ 78-6-14, 78-7-35. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, U.R.C.R 84. 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, 
U.R.C.P. 12(d). 
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22. 
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24. 
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.P. 10(b). 
One form of action, U.R.C.R 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a). 
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A-9a-
203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished, U.R.C.P. 65B(a). 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial Code, 
personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14. 
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affirmative defenses. 





—Election of remedies. 
—Estoppel. 
Failure to plead. 
—Failure of consideration. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
—Failure to plead. 
Affidavit opposing summary judgment 
Denial. 
Notice and opportunity. 
Permissive amendment. 
Waiver of defense. 
—Fraud. 
Necessary allegations. 
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act. 
— Mitigation of damages. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
— Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Pleading. 
—Statute of limitations. 
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or 
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is 
made a party. A party may raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party 
or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue 
or be sued in a representative capacity, by specific negative averment, which 
shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the 
party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the 
same on the trial. 
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the 
name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and 
thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding 
by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is 
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. 
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an 
action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as 
"unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other 
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon 
the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's 
ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a 
person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of 
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions 
precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or 
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made 
the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish 
the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is 
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance 
with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign 
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient 
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing 
jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and 
with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or 
decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, 
averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other 
averments of material matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall 
be specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not 
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally 
that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision 
relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, 
the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing 
that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or 
an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derive^ from such 
statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its 
title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other designation in 
Tab 5 
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(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim 
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of 
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike 
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not 
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure 
4 7 - UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R u l e 12 
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or 
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.) 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. U.R.C.P. 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Rights of opposing party. 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
—Criteria. 












—Standard of review. 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
—Forum-selection clause in contract. 






Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
General and special appearances. 




Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
Standard of review. 
Statute of limitations. 
Summary judgment. 




—Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
—Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
Waiver of defenses. 
—Defect of parties. 
—Defective service of process. 
—Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
When issues raised. 
—Failure to join indispensable party. 
—Failure to pay consideration. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Waiver. 
Cited. 
Jurisdict ion over the person. 
When urging the trial court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction based only on documentary 
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima 
facie showing that the trial court has personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in 
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Ander-
son v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807 
Tab 6 
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Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after 
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 




—After pretrial order 
—Alternative to dismissal 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Prolix complaint. 
—Amendment of response 
—Answer 
To include counterclaim. 
— Complaint. 
To defeat motion for summary judgment 







— Dismissal without opportunity to amend. 
— Following dismisal. 
—Grounds. 
— Late amendment 
Day of trial. 
During or after trial. 
— New parties. 
— Pro se petitions. 
—Reply amounting to amendment. 
—"Responsive pleading." 
—Substitution of parties. 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
—Allowed 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
—Amendment unnecessary. 
Consent to try issue. 
Evidence supporting findings. 
Issue raised by complaint. 
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78B-2-307. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received: 
(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in Aiiiinq 
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise; or 
(c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, Chapter 
6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to one year, 
under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); and 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
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